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Defense Counsel and Public Defense
Eve Brensike Primus*
Public-defense delivery systems nationwide are grossly
inadequate. Public defenders are forced to handle caseloads that
no one could effectively manage. They often have no funding
for investigation or expert assistance. They aren’t adequately
trained, and there is little to no oversight of their work. In many
jurisdictions, the public-defense function is not sufficiently
independent of the judiciary or the elected branches to allow for
zealous representation. The result is an assembly line into prison,
mostly for poor people of color, with little check on the reliability
or fairness of the process. Innocent people are convicted, precious
resources are wasted, and the legitimacy of the entire criminal
justice system is undermined. This chapter suggests that effective
reform is possible if policymakers address how public-defense
delivery systems are structured, whether they are independent,
the sources and amount of funding allocated to public defense,
and the adequacy of training and oversight mechanisms.
INTRODUCTION
There is broad agreement that indigent-defense delivery systems in
this country are grossly inadequate. More than 80% of American criminal
defendants are indigent,1 so the failure to provide for the public-defense
function compromises the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. A
lack of sufficient funding forces public defenders to handle caseloads that no one
could effectively manage. Defenders’ abilities to provide quality representation
are further compromised by a lack of independence from other branches of
government, an absence of attorney training programs, and a failure at all
levels to oversee effectively the provision of public-defense services. The result
is an assembly line into prison, mostly for poor people of color, with little check
on the reliability or fairness of the process.
*
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Susan Bandes,
Darryl Brown, David Carroll, Beth Colgan, Jennifer Laurin, Richard Leo, Justin Murray, and
Jonathan Sacks for helpful comments. In addition, I would like to thank Erik Luna and the staff
at Arizona State University College of Law for their Herculean efforts in organizing this project
and the Charles Koch Foundation for funding this endeavor.
1.
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
(Nov. 2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
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In recent years, many nonprofit organizations have issued reports
documenting the public-defense crisis.2 Recognizing the importance of the
problem, two-thirds of the states have created indigent defense commissions
to think about and implement reform.3 President Obama created the Office
for Access to Justice4 to provide federal support to the reform efforts, and
legislatures around the country are thinking about suggested improvements.
This chapter explores the contours of the public-defense crisis and explains
why it is an essential area for criminal justice reform, canvasses the scholarship
on this problem, and identifies possible reforms to fix the system. Ultimately,
I recommend that policymakers address how public-defense delivery systems
are structured (as public-defender offices, assigned-counsel systems, or contract
systems); whether they are independent of the judicial, legislative, and executive
branches in their jurisdictions; the sources and amounts of funding allocated
to public defense; and what training and oversight mechanisms exist to ensure
defense attorneys are effective. Through a combination of reforms in these areas,
policymakers can begin to fix broken public-defense delivery systems.
I. THE PUBLIC-DEFENSE CRISIS AND WHY IT MATTERS
In 1963, the Supreme Court held that criminal defendants facing felony
charges have a Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel regardless of their ability
to pay for it.5 The Court later extended this right to alleged misdemeanants
facing actual imprisonment upon conviction.6 It also recognized a constitutional
2.
See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/
default/files/justice_20090511.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED]; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAW., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/ [hereinafter MINOR CRIMES];
NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM—SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE
PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS (June 2008), http://www.mynlada.org/michigan/michigan_
report.pdf [hereinafter RACE TO THE BOTTOM]; ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter
BROKEN PROMISE].
3.
THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, STATE, COUNTY, AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 5 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_expenditures_fy08.authcheckdam.
pdf [hereinafter EXPENDITURES].
4.
See Office for Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atj.
5.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6.
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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right to counsel for criminal defendants on their first appeals7 and for juveniles
facing delinquency proceedings that result in a loss of freedom.8
In response to the judicial mandate, Congress passed the Criminal Justice
Act of 1964,9 requiring federal district courts to adopt local plans for furnishing
counsel to indigent defendants in federal court. Each plan was to include
either a Federal Public Defender Organization (a governmental entity in the
judicial branch) or a Community Defender Organization (a private, nonprofit
organization) in addition to a court-approved panel of private attorneys
available to take indigent criminal defense cases.
Some states and localities have followed suit and created public-defender
programs. Others rely on assigned-counsel systems under which private attorneys
are appointed on case-by-case bases and are paid per hour, per case, or per event
in a case. Still others have contract systems under which private attorneys, law
firms, or nonprofit entities contract with the state or local government and are
paid flat fees to provide representation in a percentage of indigent-defense cases.
Many states use some combination of public-defender offices, assigned-counsel
programs, and contract systems to provide for indigent defense.
The right to counsel has always been an unfunded mandate. As criminal
codes proliferated in the 1970s and ’80s as part of the war on drugs, and
legislatures earmarked more funding for law enforcement, criminal court
dockets exploded but without corresponding increases in public-defense
funding. Numerous investigative reports now document a public-defense
crisis characterized by funding problems, a lack of independence, and a
failure of training and oversight. These structural problems create a culture of
indifference in criminal courts, leading to the wrongful conviction of innocent
people10 and undermining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
A. FUNDING PROBLEMS
The vast majority of American criminal defendants are indigent, and
funding for public defense is grossly insufficient for providing adequate legal
representation to such a large client base. A few numbers should make the
point. According to the American Bar Association (ABA), no defender should

7.
8.
9.
10.

See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A).
See Brandon L. Garrett, “Actual Innocence and Wrongful Convictions,” in the present Volume.
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handle more than 400 misdemeanor cases in a year.11 In Chicago and Atlanta,
however, public defenders have had to handle more than 2,000 misdemeanor
cases annually.12 In New Orleans, funding shortages have forced public defenders
to handle almost 19,000 misdemeanor cases per year.13 Similarly, the ABA
recommends that no defender handle more than 150 felony cases each year,14 but
public defenders in Florida’s Miami-Dade County have had to handle more than
700.15 Countless reports document excessive defender caseloads arising from the
lack of funding.16 The sheer volume of cases means that many defendants sit in
jail for months before speaking to their court-appointed lawyers.17
In addition to lacking the funds to pay an adequate number of attorneys,
public-defender offices lack the funds necessary to provide the attorneys they do
have with training, mentorship, or supervision. Lacking training and support,
and asked to handle far more cases than is feasible, defenders commonly feel
overwhelmed. They often burn out and quit after only a year or two on the
job, leaving much indigent-defense representation to a rotating crop of new,
inexperienced attorneys.
A lack of funding also means insufficient resources for adequate investigative
assistance. In 2013, six states reported that they had fewer than 10 total
investigators on staff for all of the state’s public-defender offices.18 Many cases
are resolved with no investigation whatsoever.

11.
ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A
PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002) [hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES]. The American Bar
Association has sent mixed signals about whether it recommends that no attorney handle more
than 300 or 400 misdemeanor cases in a year. Compare id. (400 cases), with ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 72, 72 n.13 (3d ed. 1992) (300 cases). Under either
number, current defender caseloads far exceed the recommendation.
12.
See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 2, at 21.
13.
Id.
14.
TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 10.
15.
See KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S JUSTICE 91–94 (2013).
16.
See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, supra note 2, at 21 (reporting excessive caseloads in Texas, Arizona,
Tennessee, Utah, and Kentucky); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 65–70; RACE TO THE BOTTOM,
supra note 2, at 27; BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 2, at 16.
17.
See Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Brennan Legacy Awards Dinner, Brennan
Center for Justice (Nov. 17, 2009) (discussing these delays).
18.
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE-ADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEMS, 2013 (Nov. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saids13.pdf [hereinafter STATEADMINISTERED SYSTEMS].
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This lack of funding is striking when compared to the funding for the
prosecution and law enforcement. Prosecutors often have higher salaries than
defenders,19 lighter caseloads, and more access to investigative and expert
assistance.20 Prosecutors have the police department and state crime labs to
help with their investigations, whereas defense attorneys often have neither
investigative nor expert assistance readily available.
The source of public-defense funding is also troubling. A 2010 report found
that only 23 states completely fund their indigent-defense systems at the state
level.21 In 19 states, counties shoulder the burden for more than half of the
funding. Pennsylvania requires its counties to provide all of the funding for
indigent defense. A lack of state funding means that financial resources cannot
be spread across the state. Urban counties with large indigent populations are
overwhelmed and have resorted to conscripting unwilling and inexperienced
attorneys who have no criminal-defense background and no financial incentive
to be zealous advocates to represent indigent criminal defendants. Other urban
counties resort to flat-fee contract systems to save money, resulting in defense
lawyers who carry large caseloads for little compensation. These contract
lawyers often have to supplement their incomes with other work, resulting in
less time for their indigent-defense clients.
Many less-populous rural counties rely on assigned-counsel systems
under which attorneys are paid as little as $40 per hour with hard caps on
how much an attorney can earn per case.22 With caps as low as $500 per
felony case,23 these attorneys have no financial incentive to go to trial, do legal
research, or investigate. They are better off pleading out a case, getting the
fee, and getting a new client.

19.
Some jurisdictions with large public defender offices have achieved salary parity through
legislation or local practice, but disparities persist in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ronald F.
Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 219 (2004).
20.
See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993).
21.
See EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 5.
22.
See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN
NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW (2007), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_2007felony_
comp_rates_update_nonfelony.authcheckdam.pdf.
23.
Id. at 9–16.
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Even in counties that can afford public-defender offices, the reliance on county
funds often means that the income stream for the office is not stable. In New
Orleans, for example, the public-defense budget relies on traffic-ticket revenue.24
If the police do not issue enough tickets, there is no money for indigent defense.
B. LACK OF INDEPENDENCE
Many indigent-defense attorneys cannot provide effective representation,
because they are not sufficiently independent of the judiciary. A statewide
survey of Nebraska judges revealed that some judges punish court-appointed
attorneys who take cases to trial rather than pleading them out by not
reappointing those attorneys in future cases.25 In Texas, there are reports of
judges appointing those with whom they have personal relationships.26 And
in Detroit, Michigan, some claim that judges give cases to attorneys who make
contributions to their re-election campaigns.27
Independence problems also exist when elected legislative or executive officials
have too much control over public-defender offices. A recent report documented
nine states in which the governor had the power to fire the chief public defender,28
and claims persist that governors have used their removal power to fire especially
zealous defenders.29 In Onondaga County, New York, the Legal Aid Society lost a
contract to handle city court cases after the director was questioned by a legislative
committee about why she was filing motions and making discovery requests instead
of pleading cases.30 And in some jurisdictions, the public defender is chosen by an
advisory board that consists entirely of law enforcement personnel and prosecutors
who have a vested interest in ensuring that prosecutions are successful.31

24.
See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993); see also David Carroll, Indigent Defense
Progress Stunted by Outdated Funding Mechanism in Louisiana, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://sixthamendment.org/indigent-defense-progress-stunted-by-out-datedfunding-mechanism-in-louisiana/. For a more general description of the problems associated
with using fines and fees to fund the criminal justice system, see Beth A. Colgan, “Fines, Fees, and
Forfeitures,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
25.
JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 82–83; Holder Remarks, supra note 17.
26.
JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 82–83.
27.
RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 27.
28.
STATE-ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS, supra note 18.
29.
See Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 1769, 1790 & n.116 (2016) (collecting examples).
30.
See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 81.
31.
See, e.g., Manny Araujo, New Public Defender Set to Start Amid Questions About Hiring
Process, EUREKA TIME-STANDARD (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.times-standard.com/article/
NJ/20170218/NEWS/170219800.
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Such independence problems are built in to the federal defender system, because
the Criminal Justice Act vests control over the structure of appointment and
funding for indigent defense in the local courts.32 This means local judges decide
which attorneys can be panel attorneys and whether to approve their payment
vouchers or expense requests. Similarly, circuit courts hire the heads of the federal
defender organizations and determine how many attorneys can work in the offices.
Moreover, the judiciary is charged with asking Congress for funding for both the
courts and the defense function at the same time. A 2015 report documented
judicial concern that the Executive and Budget Committees sought to reduce the
defender budget in order to protect and grow the judiciary’s own budget.33
C. FAILURE TO TRAIN AND OVERSEE
Too often, defenders are thrown into the job without training, and their
performance is never evaluated. Many offices do not have training directors
or funds for training programs. Attorneys learn in court, and defenders often
get no constructive feedback from, or substantive review by, supervisors. In
assigned-counsel and contract systems, there is often no supervisor at all—just
a bureaucrat who coordinates appointments. And the local bar associations do
a terrible job of finding and removing ineffective attorneys.34
Courts have done little to address these problems. Citing separation-ofpowers principles, judges have been loath to inject themselves into state funding
issues. Moreover, given the prevailing constitutional standard for judging the
adequacy of trial representation, the very fact that defenders are persistently
underfunded and overwhelmed prevents courts from ruling that any particular
failure of representation is a constitutional violation for which a court could
order a remedy. Under Strickland v. Washington,35 there is no constitutional
violation of the right to effective counsel unless the defendant shows that (a)
his attorney performed unreasonably given prevailing norms of practice (with
a heavy measure of deference to the trial attorney’s strategic decisions and a
presumption that decisions were strategic) and (b) the attorney’s deficient
performance prejudiced the case outcome. When prevailing norms of practice
require attorneys to carry excessive caseloads and meet clients for the first time
on the trial date, it is hard to show deficient performance. And when there is
little to no pretrial investigation, it is hard to demonstrate prejudice.
32.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
33.
See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAW., FEDERAL INDIGENT DEFENSE 2015: THE INDEPENDENCE
IMPERATIVE 24 (2015).
34.
See, e.g., Carol Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 2705
(2013) (arguing that bar associations could do more).
35.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Given the difficulty of getting courts to rule that the representation in any
given trial was inadequate under Strickland, some public defenders and advocacy
groups have filed pretrial lawsuits arguing that funding and independence
problems in particular jurisdictions violate the Sixth Amendment, because they
constructively deny indigent defendants counsel altogether.36 These lawsuits
present courts not just with individual cases of abysmal representation, but
with data demonstrating the gross inadequacy of public-defense delivery
systems as a whole. Nonetheless, many courts have been reticent to get involved.
Some courts have dismissed the cases on procedural grounds;37 other cases
have settled.38 And even in the few places where courts have found systemic
constitutional violations,39 the process has been extremely time- and resourceintensive, and the long-term impact of favorable decisions remains unclear.40
D. A BROKEN SYSTEM WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES
The lack of funding, excessive caseloads, minimal training, lack of
independence, and failure of oversight make it impossible for defense attorneys
to do their jobs. The result is a breakdown in the adversarial system that
results in wrongful convictions and undermines the legitimacy and fairness
of the system. In too many jurisdictions, criminal-defense attorneys show up
on the day of court having never met their clients and having conducted no
investigation or legal research into their cases. After a hurried five-minute
conversation, the client is pushed into a plea and forced down the assembly
36.
See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (noting that, if “the surrounding
circumstances made it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance,” it would
be appropriate to presume ineffectiveness); see also Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long,
Public Defender Offices are Suing—and Starting to Win, A.B.A. JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2017) (describing
lawsuits); Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 427 (2009) (same); Stephen F. Hanlon, State Constitutional Challenges to Indigent
Defense Systems, 75 MO. L. REV. 751 (2010) (same).
37.
See, e.g., Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 676–79 (11th Cir. 1992); Duncan v. State, 784
N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676,
2687-88 (2013) (collecting cases and discussing procedural barriers).
38.
See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010) (settlement
order available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/10.21.14_hurrellharring_settlement.PDF).
39.
See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
40.
Even after the New York settlement in Hurrell-Harring, for example, the state had trouble
implementing legislative reforms. See Press Release, ACLU, Governor Rejects Bipartisan Reform
of Public Defense System (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/governor-rejects-bipartisanreform-public-defense-system; see also Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: The Next
Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1331 (2013) (noting that
systemic litigation is time-consuming and expensive). But see Press Release, NYCLU, Lawmakers
Pass Major Statewide Reforms of Public Defense System (April 10, 2107), https://www.nyclu.org/
en/news/lawmakers-pass-major-statewide-reforms-public-defense-system.
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line to prison.41 Many indigent criminal defendants do not even get that fiveminute conversation with an attorney; their constitutional rights to counsel are
simply ignored, and they are forced to navigate the justice system without any
help whatsoever.42 No one listens to the defendant’s side of the story, questions
the adequacy of the prosecution’s proof, or even explains to the defendant what
is happening. All that the defendant’s family and friends see is another poor
person of color being processed through the system.43 Sometimes defendants’
pleas are taken en masse as group after group of men in orange jumpsuits are
corralled into the courtroom and carted off to prison.44
This failure to provide defendants with adequate representation contributes
to the wrongful imprisonment of innocent people. Scientific advances like DNA
testing have made the public more aware that wrongful convictions happen.45
Defense lawyers are supposed to fight to prevent the conviction of innocent
people, but crushing caseloads and a lack of time and funding to investigate
cases inhibits their ability to perform that vital role. The chief district defender
for Orleans Parish in Louisiana recently acknowledged that his office is not
able to guarantee “the timely retrieval of … important evidence before it [is]
routinely erased” and, as a result, innocent people can be imprisoned.46
The fact that our system does not care about or listen to the people it
imprisons is problematic not just for the innocent. It also undermines the
legitimacy of the system in the eyes of the public. As a matter of procedural
justice, when people do not feel that they have been treated fairly, it is hard for
them to respect the system’s results.47 That lack of respect, in turn, encourages
lawlessness and undermines the goals of the criminal justice system. Indigent
41.
See, e.g., Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 278 (Fla. 2013)
(“Witnesses from the Public Defender’s Office described ‘meet and greet pleas’ as being routine
procedure.”); see also BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 2, at 16 (describing this practice in other
jurisdictions). For a more detailed description of the plea bargaining system and its problems,
see Jenia I. Turner, “Plea Bargaining,” in the present Volume.
42.
See RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 15–16 (describing denials of counsel and
explaining that local practitioners often refers to arraignment days in court as “McJustice Day”
for this reason).
43.
See Paul Butler, “Race and Adjudication,” in the present Volume.
44.
See United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 693–94 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing this
practice). I have personally witnessed this group-plea process in Genesee County, Michigan. See
Primus, supra note 29, at 1777.
45.
See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
GO WRONG (2011); see also Garrett, supra note 10.
46.
Derwyn Bunton, When the Public Defender Says “I Can’t Help,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/when-the-public-defender-says-i-cant-help.
html?_r=0.
47.
See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).

130

Reforming Criminal Justice

criminal defendants routinely complain that their trial attorneys assume that
they are guilty, don’t listen to them, and don’t communicate with them.48
That is a problem in any system that wants to be perceived as legitimate, but
it is particularly problematic in an adversarial system that relies on zealous
defenders to justify its results.
The failure to provide defendants with adequate trial representation also
creates inefficiencies in the system and generates larger costs later in the process.
Society pays to imprison people who would have been released had they had
competent counsel to argue for them.49 And money is wasted at the appellate
and post-conviction stages relitigating cases that would not be in the system if
they had been properly litigated at trial.50
II. RESEARCH ON THE PUBLIC-DEFENSE CRISIS
Researchers have addressed the funding, independence, training, oversight,
and cultural problems discussed above. There is also research that more
generally considers how to improve the reliability and quality of defense
representation assuming a financially strained environment.
A. FUNDING
Many have argued for more public-defense funding at the national level as
well as at state and local levels.51 Some suggest that funding should be tied to
data-supported workload standards.52 Others want to compare defense and
prosecutorial funding.53 For example, prosecutors and defenders could create
weighted caseload studies about their needs and ask the legislature to commit
to funding the same percentage for each side or to develop a formula that would
48.
See Primus, supra note 29, at 1776.
49.
See Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, “Pretrial Detention and Bail,” in the present
Volume (noting that the lack of counsel at bail review hearings leads to larger rates of pretrial
incarceration).
50.
See Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791 (2009) (arguing that money spent in federal habeas review might
be better spent upfront on better trial representation); see also Eve Brensike Primus, Structural
Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
679 (2007) (noting that money is wasted when appellate counsel are not able to raise ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claims); Nancy J. King, “Criminal Appeals,” in the present Volume
(describing waste at the appellate level).
51.
See, e.g., BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 2, at 41; Chemerinsky, supra note 37 (discussing the
need for funding); Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2173–74 (2013)
52.
Missouri and Texas have conducted these studies and others are underway in Colorado,
Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
53.
See Wright, supra note 19.
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require defender funding to be at least a specified percentage of prosecution and
law enforcement funding.54
Many have argued that it would be more cost-effective to provide most
public-defense services through public-defender offices rather than assignedcounsel or contract systems.55 It is more efficient to pay for and run one office
than to fund many individual practitioners who are working separately but
doing the same thing. Defenders working together can pool resources from
office space and computer resources to support services and intellectual
capital.56 They can divide their work more efficiently, systematically train and
supervise entering attorneys more readily, and share information in ways that
promote efficiency and improve the quality of their representation. Studies in
Texas document that public-defender offices would cost 23% to 31% less per
misdemeanor and 8% to 22% less per felony than assigned-counsel systems,
resulting in annual statewide savings of $13.7 million.57 Similar studies in New

54.
See id. at 238–41 (noting how Tennessee has a ratio that allocates 75 cents to public defense
for every dollar given to the prosecution and how Connecticut funding targets for public defense
are set at 2/3 the level for the prosecution); David E. Patton, The Structure of Federal Public
Defense: A Call for Independence, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2017) (arguing that public defense
funding should be linked to a percentage of law enforcement and prosecutorial funding).
55.
See Primus, supra note 29, at 1806-07; MICHIGAN INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION,
DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM MODELS: PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS IN PUBLIC DEFENSE (Dec. 2016), http://
michiganidc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Delivery-System-Reform-Models-FinalDec-2016.pdf (explaining why public defender offices promote higher quality representation,
are more cost-effective, and provide institutional resources to the system); TEXAS TASK FORCE ON
INDIGENT DEFENSE & THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, BLUEPRINT FOR CREATING A PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES IN
TEXAS (June 2008), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/36005/2008blueprintfinal.pdf [hereinafter
BLUEPRINT] (same); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense
Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316, 2328 (2013) (“Those
who are receptive to the smart-on-crime approach eventually will recognize that the better
equipped our indigent defense system is, the less waste and inefficiency our criminal justice
system will produce.”).
56.
See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, NATIONAL INDIGENT DEFENSE
REFORM: THE SOLUTION IS MULTIFACETED 21–22 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_national_indigent_defense_reform.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter SOLUTION].
57.
See TEXAS TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, EVIDENCE FOR THE FEASIBILITY OF PUBLIC DEFENDER
OFFICES IN TEXAS (2011), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31124/pd-feasibility_final.pdf.
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York and Iowa project cost savings of between $125 and $200 per case.58 Other
studies conclude that public-defender offices often deliver lower conviction
rates and shorter sentences than assigned-counsel systems, which would result
in reduced probation and prison costs down the line.59
Some scholars have suggested that tradeoffs within the criminal justice
system can and should be made to make more funding available. For example,
Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann have argued that Congress should
drastically cut federal habeas corpus review and divert the money saved to
public defense.60 More recently, some scholars have argued for reducing publicdefense costs by permitting non-lawyers to represent criminal defendants in
limited circumstances.61 Professor Stephanos Bibas has gone further, suggesting
that we (a) shrink the constitutional right to counsel so it applies only to felonies
that result in imprisonment or (b) modify criminal justice procedural rules to
58.
According to a 2014 study in upstate New York, public defenders spent an average of
$255.28 per weighted case whereas assigned counsel spent an average of $382.59 per weighted
case. See NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES, ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF COMPLIANCE
WITH MAXIMUM NATIONAL CASELOAD LIMITS IN UPSTATE NEW YORK—2014 UPDATE (Nov. 2015), https://
www.ils.ny.gov/files/Estimate%20of%20the%20Cost%20of%20Compliance%20with%20
Maximum%20National%20Caseload%20Limits%20in%20Upstate%20New%20York%20-%20
2014%20Update%20-%20FINAL.pdf. Given that assigned counsel handled 239,525 weighted
cases in 2014, see id.; the state could have saved $30,493,927.75 had those cases been handled by
public defender offices. A 2007 report from Iowa documented a cost per case for public defenders
at $227 as compared to $427 for court-appointed private attorneys. See OFFICE OF THE IOWA STATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER, STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S EFFICIENCY REPORT 2 (Dec. 7, 2007), https://www.legis.
iowa.gov/docs/publications/DF/7519.pdf.
59.
See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?: The
Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012) (noting that public
defenders reduce their clients’ murder conviction rate by 19% and lower the probability that
their clients will receive a life sentence by 62% and that public defenders reduce overall expected
time served in prison by 24% when compared to assigned counsel); RADHA IYENGAR, AN ANALYSIS
OF THE PERFORMANCE OF FEDERAL INDIGENT DEFENSE COUNSEL (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working
Paper No. 13187, 2007), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Iyengar%202007.pdf (“Defendants with
CJA panel attorneys are on average more likely to be found guilty and on average receive longer
sentences. Overall, the expected sentence for defendants with CJA panel attorneys is nearly 8
months longer.”).
60.
See King & Hoffmann, supra note 50. I am not persuaded that streamlining federal habeas
corpus review in the ways that Professors King and Hoffmann propose will result in significant
cost savings, and, given the injustice that currently plagues public-defense delivery in the states, I
am reticent to impose additional limits on access to the federal courts. See Eve Brensike Primus,
A Crisis in Federal Habeas Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 887 (2012).
61.
See Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 113, 127 (2012); Drinan,
supra note 40, at 1335–44; Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel
Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 994 (2012). I am skeptical of this
proposal for the reasons discussion in Part III, infra.
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eliminate many rules of evidence and adopt more of an inquisitorial system
that would not need lawyers.62 Finally, a number of experts argue that the
costs of public-defense delivery can be reduced by decriminalizing nonviolent
offenses, diverting certain offenses to pretrial service programs, or reclassifying
offenses as civil infractions.63
In my own work, I have argued that policymakers need to improve the
sources as well as the amounts of public-defense funding.64 Placing the fiscal and
organizational responsibilities for indigent defense at the county level creates
an impoverished, dependent, and unstable defender culture. It is accordingly
essential that public defense be funded on a statewide basis.
B. INDEPENDENCE
Although many experts have argued that a lack of funding contributes to
the public-defense crisis, it is not just about money. A number of scholars
have also recognized that the public-defense function must be sufficiently
independent of the judiciary, chief executive, and legislature so that defenders
can provide zealous representation without fear of repercussions.65 Whether
the indigent-defense commission or public-defender office should be run by an
independent public-interest board of trustees or housed under the executive or
legislative branches remains contested,66 but scholars agree that judges should
not oversee the hiring, payment, and assignment of cases to the attorneys who
appear before them. They also agree that public-defense delivery systems must
be sufficiently insulated from the legislative and executive branches that they
can provide zealous advocacy without fear of losing jobs or funding.
C. TRAINING AND OVERSIGHT
Scholars urging more training for entry-level defenders have pointed to
defender programs like the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C., as
providing a model.67 These experts contend that initial training should be
62.
See Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1287 (2013).
63.
See, e.g., SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 9, 14–17; Fairfax, supra note 55, at 2329–32; Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2015); Alexandra Natapoff,
“Misdemeanors,” in Volume 1 of the present Report.
64.
See Primus, supra note 29, at 1783–89.
65.
See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1789–91; Patton, supra note 54.
66.
See Patton, supra note 54.
67.
See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1813–15; Steiker, supra note 34, at 2707; Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
81, 90–92 (1995); SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 11.

134

Reforming Criminal Justice

followed by a period of supervision with access to mentors.68 Indigent-defense
administrators should develop metrics designed to measure the performance
of their line attorneys and should, at regular intervals, evaluate their progress.69
Some contend that local bar associations and indigent-defense commissions
can play important oversight roles both in preparing and publishing standards
that represent best practices and in coordinating and superintending the
oversight of appointed counsel and public-defender systems.70
The judiciary also has an important oversight role to play, so long as its
oversight functions do not compromise defender independence by directly
involving judges in the hiring, case assignment, and payment of attorneys. For
example, scholars have proposed that courts should review the adequacy of
public-defense delivery systems and the defenders’ abilities to provide zealous
representation. Some scholars want trial judges to be sensitive to caseload
pressures and resource constraints and more willing to take creative pretrial
steps to address these issues. For example, Professor Donald Dripps has argued
that courts, during initial plea colloquies, should inquire in open court and
make affirmative findings that defense counsel has provided effective assistance
before being willing to enter a guilty plea.71 He also contends that trial courts
should inquire before a trial whether the defense is institutionally equipped to
litigate as effectively as the prosecution.72 Professor Carol Steiker encourages
trial judges to refer inadequate attorneys for bar discipline.73
Others contend that courts should be more willing to entertain legal
challenges to indigent-defense delivery systems and use their supervisory
powers to impose caseload limits or catalyze legislative reforms.74 Courts in
Missouri and Florida have taken bold steps forward by empowering public
defenders to withdraw from or prevent future appointments in cases once
their caseloads reach a certain level.75 In many states, the mere threat that the
68.
See THE CAPITAL AREA PRIVATE DEFENDER SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2015), https://assets.
adobe.com/link/d1b1b70a-4a44-474e-64b3-247893a13829?section=activity_public&page=1
[hereinafter CAPITAL AREA REPORT] (describing a mentoring program that exists in Texas).
69.
See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1816; SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 25–26.
70.
See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1818; Drinan, supra note 40, at 1315–19 (discussing the
importance of creating professional standards); SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 18–24.
71.
See Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 883, 918 (2013).
72.
See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997).
73.
See Steiker, supra note 34, at 2705.
74.
See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1819.
75.
See Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 279 (Fla. 2013); State
ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
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judiciary is going to get involved has been sufficient to prompt legislative action.
In Massachusetts, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court once threatened
that it was going to order the release of all defendants detained pretrial unless
attorneys were appointed for them within a specific time period. In response,
the Massachusetts Legislature increased the defender office’s funding.76 Cases
in Georgia, Washington, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Louisiana have all
catalyzed similar reforms.77
Finally, scholars have argued that the federal government could do more
to protect the right to counsel. Some have suggested that a greater share of
the federal funding currently provided to support state and local criminal
justice projects should be earmarked for indigent defense or that such funding
should be conditioned on state compliance with minimal standards for the
provision of public defense.78 Others want Congress to pass legislation creating
a National Criminal Justice Commission—an oversight body designed to
review state and federal criminal justice systems and make recommendations
for improvement.79 Professor Cara Drinan has argued for a National Right to
Counsel Act that would create a private right of action for individuals to sue
in federal court alleging right-to-counsel violations.80 I have suggested that
Congress enact legislation that would give the Justice Department and other

76.
See Steiker, supra note 34, at 2703 (discussing the Massachusetts example).
77.
See VIDHYA K. REDDY, INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM: THE ROLE OF SYSTEMIC LITIGATION IN
OPERATIONALIZING THE GIDEON RIGHT TO COUNSEL 17–36 (Wash. U. Sch. of Law Working Paper
No. 1279185, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279185 (discussing
cases).
78.
Steiker, supra note 34, at 2709.
79.
See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American
Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597, 612–13 (2011).
80.
See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the
Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2010). Although I support such an act
in theory, it could face constitutional challenges in federal court. Abstention doctrine requires
the federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state court criminal proceedings. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). It remains unclear whether abstention is constitutionally
required or merely prudential. Thus, it is unclear whether Congress can legislate around it. As
a result, I have counseled against relying solely on a private cause of action to get federal courts
to address these problems. See EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, LITIGATION
STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (2010).

136

Reforming Criminal Justice

deputized interest groups the power to file enforcement actions against any
state that engages in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives criminal
defendants of the right to effective counsel.81
D. RELIABILITY AND QUALITY OF PUBLIC DEFENSE
One simple way to improve the reliability and quality of public-defense
representation is to allow defense lawyers to give cases the time that they require
rather than mass-processing them. For private attorneys, that means banning
flat-fee contracts (as Nevada recently has done), that incentivize the speedy
disposition of cases over quality representation.82 It also means paying private
attorneys a reasonable hourly wage for taking indigent-defense cases. For
public defenders, it means putting caps on caseloads, like those that now exist
in Washington and Massachusetts.83 Not surprisingly, empirical research shows
that attorneys can spend more time with their clients, investigate cases more
thoroughly, and provide better representation when their caseloads are capped.84
One county in Texas is currently experimenting with a client-choice model of
defender assignment to improve defender culture. Originally proposed by Professors
Stephen Schulhofer and David Friedman,85 this model permits defendants to select
the attorneys who will represent them at state expense. The idea is that attorneys who
communicate effectively with their clients and do well for their clients will be sought
after, while those who do not will lose business and be driven out of the market.
I have argued that state-funded, statewide public-defender offices improve the
quality of indigent-defense representation and are better than assigned-counsel
or contract systems.86 Their group structure tends to promote more training and
81.
See PRIMUS, LITIGATION STRATEGIES, supra note 80. I also proposed federal legislation that
would create a post-trial habeas action that would permit litigants to bring systemic violations
of the right to counsel to light and permit federal courts to address them without running into
abstention doctrine concerns. See id.; see also Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas
Corpus, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2010).
82.
See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1811; SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 30.
83.
See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 2, at 24; Primus, supra note 29, at 1809–10.
84.
See, e.g., MELISSA LABRIOLA ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORMS IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK: AN
ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY CASE CAPS AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD (2015), http://www.courtinnovation.
org/sites/default/files/documents/Case_Caps%20_NYC_0.pdf.
85.
See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting
Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal
Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73 (1993); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for
Indigent Criminal Defendants: Theory and Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505 (2015)
(describing the Texas experiment).
86.
See Primus, supra note 29, at 1806-09; see also MICHIGAN INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION,
supra note 55 (explaining why public defender offices promote higher quality representation, are
more cost-effective, and provide institutional resources to the system); BLUEPRINT, supra note 55.
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oversight, better communication and informal mentoring, and more pooled
resources that save attorneys time and allow them to do their jobs better.
III. IMPLEMENTING REFORM
States interested in reforming their public-defense delivery systems
should consider creating a statewide task force charged with collecting data
about the scope of the problem and making recommendations about how
best to structure public-defense delivery in the state. The task force can be
created by the governor (as in Michigan),87 the legislature (as in Idaho),88 or
the judiciary (as in Utah).89 A diverse group of criminal justice stakeholders
and policymakers (including a number of defense attorneys from different
areas of the state) should be members of the task force, and they should
engage national technical assistance to help them assess their current delivery
systems and learn about best practices nationwide.90 Ultimately, the task force
can recommend judicial, legislative, and executive interventions to improve
the system. To be effective, however, these reforms must be multifaceted,
addressing the funding, lack of independence, failure of training and oversight,
and quality problems discussed above.
A. STRUCTURE
Reformers in a given jurisdiction should first examine how public-defense
delivery systems are structured. Is there a public-defender office, an assignedcounsel system, a contract system, or some combination? Research shows that
statewide public-defender offices are more efficient and cost-effective and
also improve the quality and reliability of indigent-defense services.91 They
can more easily provide training, mentorship, and supervision for entrylevel attorneys. And their group structure allows them to effectively deploy
investigative, expert, and staff support.
87.
See David Carroll, Michigan Passes Public Defense Reform Legislation, SIXTH AMENDMENT
CENTER (June 19, 2013), http://sixthamendment.org/michigan-passes-public-defense-reformlegislation/.
88.
See David Carroll, Idaho Empowers State Commission with New Authority and New
Funding, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (March 23, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/idahoempowers-state-commission-with-new-authorities-and-new-funding/.
89.
See David Carroll, Utah Reforms Indigent Defense with First-Ever State Dollars for Trial
Representation, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (March 16, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/utahreforms-indigent-defense-with-first-ever-state-dollars-for-trial-representation/.
90.
For example, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association provided technical reports
to aid reforms in Michigan and Idaho while the Sixth Amendment Center issued a report on
Utah’s practices.
91.
See supra note 55 (collecting sources).
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Despite this research, only 22 states have statewide public-defender offices.92
Some states have not been willing to invest the initial capital that would be
required to create a statewide office (even though it would be more costeffective over time). Others have refused to adopt statewide offices because of
political pressure from attorneys who benefit from the quick, easy fees they can
obtain in assigned-counsel or contract systems. Still others have legislators who
are reticent to reform public-defense delivery systems in ways that appear soft
on crime for fear of losing re-election.
Policymakers should think creatively about how to move more states toward
statewide public-defender offices or, at the very least, toward public-defense
delivery systems that are structured to mimic the benefits of statewide publicdefender offices. If there is entrenched political opposition to a statewide
public-defender office because attorneys fear a loss of revenue, the state might
start with a statewide office that handles only a small percentage of the publicdefense caseload93 and gradually increase the caseload over time. Even a relatively
small statewide office can organize training programs for attorneys throughout
the state, collect and disseminate defender resources, and improve the quality
of representation.94 Alternatively, the state could create a statewide indigentdefense commission responsible for working with each county to ensure
that the counties provide effective defense representation. That commission
could, in turn, work with counties or regions to create local public-defender
offices, and the commission could function much as the central administration
of a statewide agency would by creating standards, implementing training
programs, and overseeing the provision of services throughout the state.95
Even with public-defender offices, states will need other indigent-defense
delivery systems to provide representation in cases where conflicts of interest
prevent one office from representing all defendants and to ensure that the

92.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007
(Sept. 2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf.
93.
The Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C., for example, is not permitted to handle
more than 60% of the indigent defense caseload. See D.C. CODE § 2-1602.
94.
States can also opt to create statewide public defender offices for certain stages of the
process. For example, a dozen states have statewide appellate public defender offices even though
they do not have statewide services at the trial level. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L.
Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 45 (Winter
1995); see also King, supra note 50.
95.
States that are unwilling to create public defender offices should find ways to create
similar group structures to take advantage of economies of scale and provide support, training,
and oversight to criminal defense attorneys in the state.
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private bar remains actively involved in defense representation.96 Flat-fee
contract systems should be banned, because they perversely encourage
attorneys to process cases quickly rather than representing their clients
well. Instead, states should adopt managed assigned-counsel systems.97 In a
managed assigned-counsel system, experienced administrators hire, train,
supervise, and coordinate the assignment of cases to private attorneys. A
good managed assigned-counsel system will create a cohesive, experienced,
and knowledgeable private criminal-defense bar that ensures quality
representation and takes advantage of economies of scale by sharing resources
and intellectual capital. It will work closely with any local public-defender
office, sharing training information and other resources, to ensure quality
representation throughout the system.
Although it is too early to reach definitive conclusions about the clientchoice model based on Texas’s ongoing experiment, I see considerable reasons
for skepticism. The client-choice model assumes that defendants will have the
requisite information to make good choices for themselves. Perhaps career
criminals who learn the system well will know who the good attorneys are, but
it seems unlikely that most arrestees will know whom to choose. Advertising
may be more important than skill. Good-looking white men might be
chosen over less attractive women or minorities based merely on stereotypes.
Moreover, client choice could create an aura of competition among defenders
that is destructive to defender culture—for example, if attorneys refuse to share
resources or advice with one another for fear of helping the competition. When
the Texas experiment is fully evaluated, one important question to ask will be
how the client-choice model affected defender culture and the quality of the
resulting representation.
All indigent-defense delivery systems—whether public-defender offices,
indigent-defense commissions, or managed assigned-counsel systems—need
to be structured to be independent of other branches of government. Publicdefender offices, indigent-defense commissions, and managed assignedcounsel systems should be run by independent commissions or boards of
trustees. No elected official should have the power to hire and fire the head of
the agency. And these boards should not be comprised solely of prosecutors
96.
Some states have adopted separate public defender offices specifically to handle conflict
cases. This has the advantage of maintaining the benefits of the group structure discussed above,
but it does not encourage the private bar to remain engaged in defense representation.
97.
For an example of a managed assigned-counsel system, see THE CAPITAL AREA PRIVATE
DEFENDER SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2015), available at https://assets.adobe.com/link/
d1b1b70a-4a44-474e-64b3-247893a13829?section=activity_public&page=1 (describing the
managed-assigned-counsel system in Travis County, Texas).
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and law enforcement officials, but rather should be staffed by a diverse group
of individuals, many of whom have criminal defense experience. The publicdefense function also needs to be independent of the judiciary. Courts should
not make appointments; approve experts, investigators, and payment vouchers;
or evaluate the performance of individual attorneys, except in the context of
legal challenges to the adequacy of an attorney’s representation. Rather, the
public defender’s office, indigent-defense commission, or administrators in the
managed assigned-counsel system should make those judgments. In the federal
system, the Criminal Justice Act needs to be amended to create an independent
body to oversee the appointment and payment of federal defenders.98
B. FUNDING
More money must be spent on public defense. Funding should be
grounded in data-supported workload studies that include consideration
of the funding earmarked for the prosecutorial function (including law
enforcement). Several firms now perform data-driven workload studies
in cooperation with state indigent-defense commissions, public-defender
offices, or bar associations.99 Policymakers should consider commissioning
workload analyses to determine how much of a funding problem exists in
particular jurisdictions and then use the results to argue for caseload caps
and for additional funds as necessary for public defense.
If a legislature cannot fully fund the public-defense function, it should
take into account how its proposed budget compares to the prosecution’s
budget. Prosecutors and defenders should be equally compensated, and
the prosecutorial and defender budgets should be proportionate to the
caseloads each office handles. When private attorneys are employed through
an assigned-counsel system, they should be paid reasonable hourly fees to
handle indigent-defense cases.

98.
See Patton, supra note 54 (proposing amendments).
99.
For example, the American Bar Association, in association with the consulting firm
RubinBrown and the Missouri State Public Defender System, recently conducted a study (using
survey techniques and empirical analytical methods) to quantify how much time a public
defender should reasonably spend on different types of cases to provide effective assistance of
counsel. See RUBINBROWN LLP, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER
SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS WITH A NATIONAL BLUEPRINT (June 2014), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_
the_missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf. The Missouri public defender used the study
to lobby for more funding and the legislature responded. See Laird, supra note 36 (describing
how the legislature relied on the data and attempted to allocate more funding).
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State legislatures should provide for statewide funding of indigent defense
even if the delivery systems are chosen at the county level. That would at least
ensure some financial stability and more independence from the influence of
local politics. Legislatures should also identify stable and dedicated funding
streams for public defense rather than relying on traffic fines, court fees, or
other assessments that are highly erratic and often fall heavily on the poorest
citizens. This would minimize the need to ask future legislatures to raise publicdefense funding, which is important given the political challenges of asking
elected officials to do anything that might appear to be soft on crime.
Finally, policymakers should consider ways to reduce criminal justice
system costs overall. By fully decriminalizing certain nonviolent offenses or
reclassifying them as civil infractions, lawmakers could alleviate caseload
burdens for defenders while also achieving larger benefits for society.100 I
am more skeptical of suggestions to reduce costs by shrinking the right to
counsel and having laypeople argue in court on behalf of criminal defendants.
Laypeople might be productively used as initial intake interviewers, subpoena
servers, public-records collectors, or liaisons to a client’s family member. In fact,
many public-defender offices already use law clerks, interns, and investigators
who are not lawyers to perform many of these functions. But an attorney is
needed in court to navigate the complexities of the substantive and procedural
laws when a person’s liberty is at stake.
C. TRAINING AND OVERSIGHT
Entry-level public defenders need to be adequately trained before they begin
representing people in court, and each new defender should have a period of
supervision with an experienced mentor once on the job. After that supervision
period ends, every defender should be evaluated by supervisors in the defender
office according to established and recognized metrics and be given feedback
about how to improve. The Atlanta-based organization Gideon’s Promise
provides a model for rigorous, entry-level defender training combined with
supervision and mentoring over a three-year period.101 Each state should have a
state-funded indigent-defense training director (housed in the administration
of the public-defender office, indigent-defense commission, or managed
assigned-counsel system) whose job is to ensure that entry-level defenders get
quality training and mentorship. Quality training should include more than
100. See Natapoff, supra note 63.
101. See Primus, supra note 29, at 1814 (describing the program); Steiker, supra note 34, at
2710–11. More information about Gideon’s Promise training and mentorship programs is
available at http://www.gideonspromise.org/.
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trial advocacy classes or information about the mechanics of the court system.
It should also teach entry-level attorneys how to relate to and communicate
with clients and how to deal with the challenges of the job.102 Each state should
also create objective metrics for assessing defender performance. Evaluation
should include observing the attorney in court, reviewing trial transcripts and
pleadings involving that attorney, looking at case outcomes, and speaking to
the clients and court personnel who have worked with the attorney.
Here too, judges can play an important role without compromising the
independence that defenders need. I agree with those who have argued that
trial judges should make ex ante inquiries into whether defenders have been
able to meet with their clients, investigate their cases, and provide effective
representation. Judges should also be more amenable to using their supervisory
authority to impose caseload limits, entertain motions to withdraw from
overwhelmed public defenders, refer ineffective attorneys to the local bar
association for disciplinary action, and encourage legislatures to address
funding and independence problems.
At the federal level, Congress should create a federal oversight body designed to
review state and federal criminal justice systems and make recommendations for
improvement. A federal body could communicate with the many indigent-defense
commissions and nonprofit organizations that are currently working on this crisis
to collect, analyze, and distribute information and prevent duplication of work.
Congress should also give the Department of Justice federal enforcement authority
to bring actions against states that systematically violate the right to counsel and
permit the Department to extend its own reach in this area by deputizing private
individuals or interest groups to file enforcement actions in its name.103
RECOMMENDATIONS
There is no one silver bullet that will solve the public-defense crisis. Rather,
policymakers must adopt reforms that address the structure of public-defense
delivery, ensure that the defense function is independent of the other branches
of government, alleviate the excessive caseloads that defenders currently have,
increase and restructure public-defense funding, and ensure that mechanisms
are in place to train attorneys and oversee the defense function.
102 See Primus, supra note 29, at 1814 (describing model training programs).
103. Even without new legislation, the federal government can continue to earmark federal
grants for states that are collecting data and trying to fix broken public defense delivery systems.
Alternatively, the Justice Department could continue its recent practice of filing amicus briefs in
support of plaintiffs challenging indigent defense delivery systems in court. Such interventions
have been critically important in encouraging states to settle these cases and make improvements
in their delivery systems.
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1.

Statewide task force. Policymakers should begin by creating a statewide
task force consisting of a diverse group of criminal justice stakeholders
and policymakers (including a number of defense attorneys from different
parts of the state) to collect data, analyze the current public-defense delivery
systems in the state, and make recommendations for improvements. The
task force should engage national technical assistance to help it assess the
current delivery systems and learn about best practices nationwide.

2.

Structure. Policymakers should strive to create state-funded, statewide
public-defender offices to handle most cases. Those statewide offices
should be supplemented by state-funded, managed assigned-counsel
systems to handle conflict-of-interest cases and continue the involvement
of the private bar in indigent-defense representation. Flat-fee contract
programs for attorney assignment should be banned. If in a given state
there is not enough political support to create a state-funded, statewide
public-defender office, policymakers should strive to create a state-funded,
statewide indigent-defense commission that can then work with localities
to create county-based or regional public-defender offices and managed
assigned-counsel systems. If a state chooses to proceed with an indigentdefense commission, it should ensure that the commission has sufficient
power vis-à-vis the counties to ensure that counties do not choose publicdefense delivery systems that are inefficient or encourage poor advocacy.

3.

Independence. Policymakers should ensure that each of a state’s chosen
public-defense delivery systems—whether public-defender offices,
managed assigned-counsel systems, or indigent-defense commissions—
are sufficiently independent of the judiciary, legislature, and executive
branch that defenders need not fear retaliation for vigorous advocacy.
Judges should never be responsible for assigning cases, approving costs,
or monitoring individual attorney performance. Instead, administrators
in the public-defender office, managed assigned-counsel system, or
indigent-defense commission should be responsible for attorney
assignment, cost and fee approval, and individual oversight. Those
administrators should be appointed by a board that is independent of
the political branches of government.

4.

Excessive caseloads. Policymakers should consider imposing caseload caps
based on data-driven case-weighting studies that indicate how many cases
attorneys in a given jurisdiction can effectively handle. In jurisdictions
where this is not possible, defense attorneys should, consistent with
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American Bar Association guidelines,104 notify the courts of their inability
to accept additional cases if doing so will compromise their ability to
provide effective representation. If they cannot provide competent
representation, they should move to withdraw from appointments, and
courts should be receptive to such requests. Bar associations should be
more willing to advocate for judicial and legislative enforcement of ethics
rules that prohibit excessive caseloads.

5.

Funding. Policymakers should ensure statewide funding for public
defense instead of relying on individual counties to pay the costs. The
amount of funding should be tied to data-driven case-weighting studies
that indicate how much public-defense funding is necessary to provide
effective representation, and it should take into account how much
funding is earmarked for the prosecution and law enforcement. Moreover,
public-defense funding should have a stable and dedicated source so
that defenders—rarely a popular constituency in budgeting processes—
do not need to continually renegotiate the source and amount of their
funding. Prosecutors and public defenders should have pay parity, and
assigned counsel should be paid a reasonable wage. Policymakers should
also consider reducing the cost of the public-defense function by fully
decriminalizing some nonviolent offenses.

6.

Training and oversight. Each public-defense delivery system should
have a training director responsible for developing and implementing
a mandatory training program for entry-level attorneys. Entry-level
training should be complemented by a mentorship program that links
entry-level defenders to senior defense attorneys. All defense attorneys
should be regularly evaluated according to established metrics and
should receive feedback on how to improve.
Judges should be willing to (a) make ex ante inquiries into the effectiveness
of defense counsel; (b) impose caseload caps; (c) grant motions to withdraw
when caseloads are excessive; (d) refer ineffective attorneys to the local bar
for discipline; and (e) be receptive to systemic challenges to public-defense

104. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF. RESP., FORMAL OPINION 06-441 (2006), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_ethics_opinion_defender_caseloads_06_441.authcheckdam.pdf; ABA STANDING COMM.
ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE (2009), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_eight_guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf.
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delivery systems. Local bar associations should take a more active role as well,
supporting public-defense reform efforts and being more willing to discipline
ineffective attorneys.
The federal government should continue to encourage states to adopt best
practices for public-defense delivery through its funding choices and by
filing amicus briefs in lawsuits challenging broken public-defense delivery
systems. It should also pass proposed legislation that would (a) create
a federal oversight body to collect, analyze, and distribute information
about best practices and (b) give the Department of Justice authority to
file federal enforcement actions (or deputize others to do so) when states
systematically violate indigent defendants’ rights to counsel.

